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Abstract 
The number of incidences of End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) supports the case that it is a public 
health emergency. The burden is often quantified by rates, leaving many people cold and 
unresponsive, leading to, as Nordgren and Morris McDonnell (2011) state, “the diminishing 
identifiably of a large number of victims” snarled in the scope-severity paradox. The subject may 
identify with the disease or illness, but who are these ill-fated others? It must go beyond 
recognition that there is an ESRD problem at hand. “Strength in numbers” hurts---according to 
scope-severity paradox and its close kin, scope insensitivity. There appears to be less of an 
incentive to upset rational choice and side with emotion if enlarging health awareness is required 
to turn the tide of disease. But I argue that this emotive will more likely activate a collective 
empathy if an ESRD patient that needs a kidney is personally known to us.  
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Severity of Scope Versus Altruism: Working Against Organ Donation’s Realization of 
Goals-An Essay 
While academic thought still tends to compartmentalize into theoretical silos, health is 
acted out on a public stage, often affecting scores of others in the process.  
As outgoing Hastings Center President Thomas Murray observed in a commentary to the 
Association of Psychological Science, bioethics is a ligand to the psychology’s substrate 
(Murray, 2002). Right and wrong is not exclusively cognitive, but it is tackled in the grey 
matter at many time points. The thought of pro-donation or con-donation then becomes 
internalized as a personal belief, and then it is realized as a collective ethic that is to be 
negotiated (Battle-Fisher, 2010). We think and decide as persons as well as collectives. 
Public health by nature follows this collective. This essay will discuss the person vs. 
collective view of organ donation and the scope-severity paradox.  
  A recent article in Social Psychological and Personality Science written by Nordgren 
and Morris McDonnell (2011) posed a research question that should be central to public 
health ethics. (This was published in a psychology journal which may not be on the radar of 
many bioethicists.) Nordgren and Morris McDonnell (2011) posit that rationality is thrown 
out of the window when the burden of people afflicted by a crime becomes 
incomprehensible.  
The basic premises of “scope-severity paradox” according to Nordgren and Morris 
McDonnell (2011) are: 
1. We only connect emotionally with crime victims within our personal social 
network (i.e. family, clan, neighborhood, civic group) that we know and 
care about.  
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2. Increasing the number of victims decreases the perception of severity of the 
problem. ’Your problem, not mine’ could be reworded as ‘call me only if a 
loved one is directly affected, otherwise I am out to lunch forever.’   
At a more elemental level, the lack of prowess in recognizing the gravity of an event 
would be explained by a presence of scope insensitivity. Desmentes et al. (2007) note the 
importance of personal gain versus loss in unraveling this scope insensitivity. But public 
health must find a way of emphasizing a collective gain/loss framing that is linked to 
personal actions. What would be the social cost for donating (gain for society and personal 
gain for patient)? Moreover, are we all not paying in the end by the lack of living donations 
(loss for society and personal loss for patient)? A central tenet of the Health Belief Model is 
perceived benefits where a health behavior must be framed as having a chance of affecting 
change in order to support the utility of that decision (Jan & Becker, 1984). This would be an 
individualized framing of gain and loss. Does this cover all of bases of explaining the 
public’s health? I say no. I would argue that while perceived benefits are individualistic, what 
is lost is the exploration of the grand scope of the health concern on decision making. 
Acknowledging that there may be “scope insensitivity” cries for viewing a lived experience 
of one patient as affecting the rest of society. But one must reframe the problem and conquer 
the hurdle of the massiveness of the need. We must overcome the chasm of scope. 
Psychology can be married to bioethics and for good use in this case. 
According to the scope-severity paradox, we do not easily care about those that we do 
not know, especially when it affects masses of far-flung individuals. I add, how much 
emotional energy can each of us realistically give, especially if specific energy needs to be 
directed to an unimaginable host of others when we have a network demanding personal 
attention? A lesson could be learned here in terms of framing scope-severity paradox around 
public health ethics. We are back to a spin on the autonomy-collective dualism that keeps 
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ethicists like me awake at night. How do we in public health solicit the compassion of 
concern for others when the burden of a disease is constructed as a systems level 
phenomenon? The question should be raised whether there can be sufficient saturation of 
altruistic compassion achieved in order to trigger widespread public health concern.  
Let us look at an issue increasing public health concern, End Stage Renal Disease 
(ESRD). In 2009, approximately 117,000 new patients began dialysis treatment (United 
States Renal Data System, 2011). It is well documented that many patients languish on 
dialysis with no viable kidney- that proverbial pot of gold- on the nearest horizon. According 
to the United States Renal Data System (2011), over 400,000 Americans were in some stage 
of dialysis treatment, with only 17,000 of those receiving a kidney in 2009. Now, plant the 
thought that there is need for organs and organs and donors will multiply based on an 
altruistic decision made by donors or their kin. Life will abundantly become more fruitful, 
with quality of life improving with each new graft as each ESRD patient joins a new 
fraternity of transplant recipients. Unfortunately, the rising action of this story often describes 
the shortcoming inherent to scarcity- the lack of the viable organ. The transplant never 
materializes. There is only fool’s gold for most ESRD patients. Only half of dialysis patients 
who do not receive a kidney live three years after starting therapy (United States Renal Data 
System, 2011). Living- living paired donation schemes have been presented as possible 
solutions to the issue of finding organs but it is presently acting at a slow percolating (albeit 
promising) simmer, accounting for 277 of all transplants in 2009 (United States Renal Data 
System, 2011).  Living donors have been more influential as of late , as there was been an 
increase of 7% in living kidney donations in 2009 versus a 1% downtick for deceased kidney 
donations during this same period (United States Renal Data System, 2011).  
There are countless “others” living with End Stage Renal Disease (who are faceless 
but are captured by statistics). For the ESRD patient, these others demand the same gift of 
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life, pining after the same pot of gold that is coyly shining and promising riches of a kidney. 
The son and caregiver of an ESRD patient should theoretically covet a betterment of life for 
his mother under the scope-severity paradox. However, compassion from this son may wane 
under the stressors of the difficulty of caring for his mother. The heightened emotion of care 
giving over the extended time requested by ESRD (and earlier stages of chronic kidney 
disease) lacks the ability to predict if the son will act. Perhaps this compassion is inexplicably 
linked to creating and nurturing a strong bond that would be a prerequisite for serving as a 
donor. 
 Action (as a donor) is what is necessary for turning the tide of late-stage ESRD 
mortality. But more importantly for public health, what is to be felt for the mass of “others” 
languishing on dialysis and competing for the same precious organs as the son’s mother? 
There is no ethical edict that requires the son to give up personal autonomy to donate the 
organ even to his mother, let alone, a stranger. What of the altruistic donors if the son is not a 
match? Often these altruistic donors highlighted in the media have their own “kidney 
narrative”, a loss of a loved one to End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) or something similar. 
This is a prime example of the gain-framed experience that perhaps is radiating from a 
personal loss. Organ donation is a situation with the best intentions (altruistic compassion), 
but does not automatically resolve with a saved life in the end. Is the son gaining a mother by 
donation (gain-frame) or losing a mother by not donating (loss-frame)? Or is it both? 
Donation is too complex to be framed in the same way of more conventional health behaviors 
for donation is what I term, an “anticipated health behavior”, one that cannot be practiced and 
reinforced through active trial and error of the behavior. What can change would be the 
donor’s state of mind as a potential donor, which is wedded to ever changing personal ethics 
(Battle-Fisher, 2010). 
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Public health needs patients, at-risk individuals and potential donors to care about the 
nameless others; if for no other reasons but to stifle the prevailing trends of disease and to 
decrease mortality.  How can compassion be accomplished when issues of scarcity such as 
viable organs may cloud one’s understanding of the plight of others sharing a similar 
narrative? By realizing the linkages of perception to scope of the incident, as Nordgren and 
Morris McDonnell (2011) contend, I assert that public health would need to champion the 
individual narratives. I purport that the closer the personal connection the better, especially 
when there are complications of scarcity of resources for this extremely vulnerable 
population (Battle-Fisher, 2010). By perhaps acknowledging the attributing influence of 
scope, this could increase compassion toward aiding others, and, therefore, assist in reversing 
large-scale public health disparities such as ESRD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please note that the opinions expressed by the author represent those of the author and do not 
reflect the opinions of the Online Journal of Health Ethics’ editorial staff, editors or 
reviewers. 
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